




















 This article retrieves Kant’s imitatio Christi as a viable alternative to the 
recent construal of mimesis as a universal human desire, in particular Ward’s 
reformulation of the imitatio Christi in such terms (in which the human condition is 
defined by an intrinsic desire for God as other). Kant’s writings participate in a very 
different debate on imitation – one sceptical of its ethical value, and this plays out as a 
continual ambivalence towards the concept in his work. Kant’s imitatio Christi, 
however, does, I contend, make possible a moral form of imitation by characterising it 
as a rational and intersubjective debate upon the good. Imitating Christ becomes part 









 Mimesis has been a live issue in contemporary theory since René Girard 
reinvigorated the debate in the early 60s, and in Graham Ward’s recent work, the 
Girardian renaissance of mimesis has even informed an articulation of the imitatio 
Christi, in which human life is intrinsically bound up with a desire to imitate Christ’s 
life and subsequent fate. In this paper, however, I wish to provide an alternative to 
Ward’s imitatio Christi by instead considering it in terms of a discussion of imitation 
dominant in the eighteenth-century. In Immanuel’s Kant’s Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason1, I contend, this discussion led to an idea of the imitatio 
Christi very different to Ward’s. 
 I will, therefore, begin by very broadly sketching the terms of the 
contemporary debate on mimesis in which Graham Ward’s account of the imitatio 
Christi is framed, before turning to the controversy that surrounded the concept in the 
eighteenth-century. This, I hope, will make possible an appreciation of the advantages 
and disadvantages of each of the concepts. It is to Kant I will devote much of the 
discussion, because – as well as developing in his ethical writings a very distinct and 
complex response to the problem of imitation – through it he also generates a view of 
the imitatio Christi that is, in my view, significant. 
 
 
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF MIMESIS 
 
 The foundations of the contemporary concern with mimesis can be traced to 
1961 and René Girard’s first work, Deceit, Desire and the Novel; it was he who was 
the first to claim that “mimetic desire is a universal reality” (Girard 1978a 105). With 
such a statement, Girard established a new way of conceiving the issue of imitation2 
both in terms of desire, and as universal, and so ineluctable. There is no such thing as 
                                               
1 I will henceforth refer to this work as the Religion. 
2 I do not attempt to formalise the relation between imitation and mimesis in this article for this is one 
of the issues at stake. Indeed, while on the one hand it would be quite natural to identify the two terms, 
mimesis’ indissoluble link to desire in contemporary critical discourse may instead lead one to speak of 
Kantian imitation as non-mimetic. 
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‘spontaneous’ desire, all desire is mediated through others; it is always relational: 
“We always desire what others desire, in imitation of them, and not on our own 
impetus. Our desires are second hand, never properly ours from the start” (Potolsky 
146). There is, therefore, a constant triangular structure to all desire – the object of my 
desire is such only because it is the object of another’s desire; or, to put it another 
way, desire imitates desire – it is essentially mimetic.  
This initial analysis has at least two consequences for Girard: first, violence 
follows (almost) as a necessity, since rivalries develop over the same object which 
different people have come to desire through mutual imitation. Girard states, 
“Mimesis generates violence and violence accelerates mimesis.” (Girard 1978a 93) 
Second, the analysis of such desire as universal has led Girard to espouse a type of 
biologism. Mimesis is what links us to the animal kingdom: “Mimetic rivalry,” he 
writes, “is not even specifically human… Mimetic phenomena provide the common 
ground between animal and human society.” (1978b 201-4) There is, he claims, an 
innate “mimetic drive” in the brain (201). Our mimetic ‘instinct’ is immediate, prior 
to all social and symbolic constructs: mimesis is “more original than meaning” (1978a 
106). Hence, Girard often speaks of mimetic desire in biological metaphors; for 
example, when he writes, “This mode of imitation operates with a quasiosmotic 
immediacy necessarily betrayed and lost in all the dualities of the modern 
problematics of desire” (89). It is such immediacy which has been famously criticised 
by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: mimesis, according to Girard, occurs “at a more 
primordial level” (1978b 203) to all thought – it exists in an impossible realm on the 
“hither side of representation” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998 111). 
  
It is within this debate that Graham Ward states at the beginning of Christ and 
Culture, “At the crux of the Christological reflections offered lies an account of desire 
and mimesis.” (Ward 2005 25) Mimesis takes on this significance for Ward, because 
it helps him escape – what he sees as – a Barthian fallacy. Karl Barth’s dialectical 
method forces him to maintain that, even when Christ becomes human, he remains 
wholly other; as Ward puts it, “Barth’s Jesus Christ is not a social animal; he is an 
other, an alien” (12). To recompense this theologically inadequate position, Ward 
emphasises “the nexus of relations in which the historical, social and cultural engage 
with the divine” (1). Ward’s Jesus Christ is, it is claimed, enmeshed in human 
relationships, embodied in “the economics of desiring” (25). The statement ‘The 
Kant’s Imitatio Christi 4
believer desires Christ’ is, then, the basic axiom of Ward’s book; and what is 
important in his unpacking of this statement is that desire for Christ should not merely 
identified with a desire for mystic union, but should remain human, political and 
active: we desire to be like Christ, not just to be unified with him. Ward, thus, 
resurrects the imitatio Christi on the basis of mimetic desire. 
 This, then, is an imitatio Christi inspired by Girard and Lacoue-Labarthe. 
Thus, while Ward accepts Lacoue-Labarthe’s criticisms of Girardian mimesis, he still 
maintains that it has its basis in desire, that this desire is universal, and that such 
desire gives birth to almost necessary violence. Hence, Ward speaks of “a madness 
born of imitation”, and he identifies such madness with “a divine logic radically at 
odds with our own and our representation’s [logic]” (58). Yet, despite Ward’s claim 
to be hereby demonstrating the social nature of Christ, we can immediately see that 
the imitatio Christi is, for him, super-rational, that it takes humanity out of itself to 
conform to patterns of acting completely alien to its being-in-the-world. To be human 
is to be universally beset by a desire to no longer be human, and instead to follow 
Christ to divinity. The imitatio Christi is conceived as an innate instinct for what is 
utterly other to human living; Ward fails to live up to his project of a social, human 
imitatio Christi.3 
 It is in direct opposition to Ward’s actual imitatio Christi (and so compatible 
with his initial project) that we can read Kant’s own attempts at formulating the 
doctrine. He is intent on demonstrating the moral significance of such mimesis; that 
is, the manner in which it is productive for human reason, and the way it aids ethical 
living in the world. Kant discovers an imitatio Christi that is not violent and 
destructive of what is human, but rather – while acknowledging theological 
orthodoxies concerning Christ – celebrates human living within the world. Thus, I 
propose to read Kant’s imitatio Christi against Kantianism as well as Barthianism: 
what is at stake in his imitatio Christi is not – as critical orthodoxy maintains – a 
denial of the possibility of incarnation and thus of embodied moral action, but rather 




                                               
3 For a more detailed account of this incongruence, see Whistler 2008. 
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THE PROBLEM OF IMITATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
 
 Before I turn to look at Kant’s own struggle with imitation, however, I want to 
first sketch the background to the debate in which Kant’s own contribution must be 
situated. There is, I contend, a discourse in the eighteenth-century that has been 
neglected despite its pertinence to Kantian ethical theory. This neglected discourse 
supplements and complicates our view of Enlightenment ethics and, in so doing, 
provides a very different context for discussions of imitation. Three figures from the 
eighteenth-century are pertinent here: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl-Philip Moritz and 
J.G. Herder. Kant maintained close (if volatile) relations with all three of them: one as 
mentor, the second as contemporary and the third as student then rival. Their use of 
imitation will thus be useful for grasping Kant’s own. 
 
The problems surrounding the concept of imitation receive their classic 
formulation in the second book of Rousseau’s Emile. It is important to note straight-
off the appearance imitation makes here in an educational treatise: while classically 
mimesis has been seen as a concept of aesthetics, through Rousseau discussion of it in 
Emile it becomes embroiled in pedagogics. Moreover, what is just as significant is 
how Rousseau considered Emile a piece of moral philosophy.4 It was ethics and 
educational reform which produced the context for imitation at the end of the 
eighteenth-century.  
On the one hand, Rousseau is adamant that imitation is often to be considered 
an evil, a corruption of natural simplicity, since it is based on relations to others. 
One’s own action is mediated through the example of another’s action; thus, imitation 
is a form of amour propre: it attends to the value of others rather than oneself. In 
society, one rather imitates to “deceive others or win applause for [one’s] own talents 
than [to] become wiser or better.” (Rousseau 1974 68) Imitation breeds “dependence 
on men”, which as “the work of society… gives rise to every kind of vice” (49). 
Hence, Rousseau advises, “The main thing is that the child shall do… nothing 
because of other people” (56-7).  
What is more, imitation is often abused as an easy short cut to what appears 
good and, as such, is concomitant with a lack of self-reflection on what that good in 
                                               
4 See Jimack 1974 ix. 
Kant’s Imitatio Christi 6
fact is. Imitation prevents the external spectator from discerning whether someone is 
in fact good or bad, since “harlequins… knowing their own baseness… try to equal 
what is better than they are” (68). In such cases of deception, it becomes impossible to 
distinguish the morally good person from someone who is reprehensible: public 
morality disintegrates. Imitation is thus bound up with an externality which masks 
what is true about a person’s character; it is a form of deception. 
 Despite all of this, Rousseau also wants to defend a conception of imitation. 
There are two reasons for this. First, to imitate something is a natural expression of 
admiration for it. All of nature is permeated by such mimetic attraction. Thus, “The 
love of imitating comes from well-regulated nature... The monkey imitates man, 
whom he fears, and not the other beasts, which he scorns; he thinks what is done by 
his betters must be good.” Only in society does imitation “become a vice”. (68) 
 Second, and more importantly for our purposes, Rousseau finds in imitation a 
useful device for teaching. Yet, even here, Rousseau’s valorisation is at best 
ambivalent. There are two types of teaching: teaching by reasoning and teaching by 
example. Rousseau attacks the first as not suitable for matters of morality and good 
living in general, since it does not alter the whole of the pupil’s being (including his5 
heart), but instead appeals merely to his mind.6 Rousseau’s example is the teaching of 
generosity: to give a child reasons for generosity will never, he contends, make them 
truly generous, for such reasons can never truly move the child; they will make the 
pupil clever enough to know why one should be generous, but never good enough to 
actually be generous. For this, only teaching by example is suitable: “Remember that 
your lessons should always be in deeds rather than words” (64). It is only by imitating 
the good example of the teacher that the pupil will truly discover the value of 
generosity in his heart and encounter it as a virtue. “Teachers,” Rousseau exclaims, 
“Be good and kind; let your example sink into your scholars’ memories until they can 
enter their hearts.” (68) 
Yet, Rousseau is insistent that imitating good examples is not in itself 
virtuous. Only once the value of virtue has been realised by the child for himself can 
he truly act in a virtuous manner, but such autonomy is unteachable: the child will 
                                               
5 Rousseau notoriously limits these observations to male pupils. 
6 Examples of Rousseau’s views on this matter are too numerous to cite. His main opponent in this 
matter was John Locke who had advocated reasoning with children; Rousseau opposes himself to this 
vogue adamantly: all such education does is train children to be argumentative and talk well, the tutor 
barrages them with words which they do not understand and so they never get to the truth of things. To 
educate by reasoning is to concentrate on the sign rather than the truth it signifies. 
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always remain passive whilst the teacher is teaching him. Imitation, while relatively a 
good method (that is, better than merely discursive pedagogy), is still only a 
preliminary to the child’s actual becoming-moral which can only occur independently 
of any teaching. Rousseau writes, 
I know that all these imitative virtues are only the virtues of a monkey, and 
that a good action is only morally good when it is done as such and not 
because others do it. But at an age when the heart does not yet feel anything, 
you must make children copy the deeds you wish to grow into habits, until 
they can do them with understanding and for the love of what is good. (ibid) 
Despite all the problems that imitation possesses, despite the fact that it is 
bound up in amour propre, that it – like all other teaching methods – is unable to 
teach morality as such, Rousseau still affirms imitation, and he does so because it 
alone is able to display moral actions – rather than merely talking about them. 
Imitation is desirable in spite of its dangers because it maintains a connection – even 
though a slight one – with the good. 
 
 The opening to Karl-Philip Moritz’ work of 1788, “On the Artistic Imitation 
of the Beautiful”, provides a significant advance on Rousseau’s discussion. Moritz 
distinguishes between parody, aping and imitating proper (or imitating “in the noble 
moral sense”). Parody is merely concerned with repeating the unique, external 
characteristics of another person (in this case, Socrates); aping is a complete imitation 
of Socrates but not for any other ulterior purpose than to copy him – this is the actor’s 
ultimate purpose. Truly moral imitation is something else entirely; it is emulation. Let 
me quote Moritz at length, 
Imitation is used in the nobler moral sense and is almost synonymous with 
the concept of striving after and competing; this is the case because the virtue 
which I imitate, for example, in a particular role model has something 
universal, something which is above individuality, and which can be 
achieved by everyone who strives after it… But since I am lesser than this 
role model, and since a certain degree of noble sentiment and type of action 
would hardly have been possible without this role model, I call my striving 
for some communal good, which must, of course, also be achieved by my 
role model, the imitation of this role model. I imitate my role model, I strive 
after him; I try to compete with him. – My role model has set my goal higher 
than if I had set it myself. I must thus strive, according to my powers, and in 
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my way, to reach this goal; I may finally forget my role model and try to set 
my goal yet further, if this is possible. Imitation only gains its true worth 
through this nobler moral sentiment. (2003 131-2) 
The role model is not here the end in itself, but rather a means to access a ‘virtue… 
which is above individuality’, a communal good which everyone can achieve by 
striving after it through others. The role model is not intrinsically important, but can 
be forgotten at the end of the process; her instrumental importance, rather, lies in 
forcing the subject to transcend herself to something existing beyond her own 
subjective horizons. The encounter with the exemplar is productive of a new ideal – 
one that, in synthesising more than one subjective viewpoint, gestures towards what is 
more universal, the good as such, rather than merely my personal good. 
 
 A very similar distinction between mere aping and true imitation can be found 
in J.G. Herder’s Essay on the Origin of Language. In uncovering what it means to use 
language, Herder resorts to differentiating animal attempts at human language from 
the human’s own use of it. He writes, 
The dog has learned to understand many words and commands, but not as 
words, only as signs associated with gestures and actions. Were he ever to 
understand a single word in the human sense, he would no longer serve, he 
would create for himself his art, his society, and his language. (Herder 1966 
126) 
There is no command over the language in the case of the animal: they imitate only 
through an external reflex; they imitate the sign and not the essence of language. 
There is no internal creative connection to the words; this language is not a principle 
of their thought, but is only causally evoked by a law of association. Animals ape 
language; it is for them an immediate instinct bypassing all conscious intention, 
whereas, for a human subject acquiring language, will and reflection are involved, and 
mediate between the sound heard and the similar sound produced. To quote Herder 
again, 
It has been assumed to be a basic principle that man wants to imitate nature 
and hence also nature’s sounds. As though such a blind inclination had any 
room for thought. And as though the ape with precisely this inclination, or the 
blackbird which is so well able to mimic sounds, has invented a language. 
(118) 
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In opposition to such mimicking which bypasses reason in favour of immediate 
sensuous reflex, there is, Herder thus suggests, the possibility of empirically-acquired, 
but still cognitive action – a hermeneutic, rather than instinctive, form of imitation. 
 
 This, then, is the context in which Kant’s reflections on imitation must be 
situated. There was throughout the eighteenth-century a profound unease about this 
concept. To affirm it was to affirm a kind of deception and so to affirm something 
seemingly unworthy of moral living; yet, at the same time, imitation was attractive for 
moral existence because it was not merely intellectual, but provided a means to 
become virtuous with one’s whole being. It is for this reason that while it was 
accepted, it was often accepted only with distinctions in tow, that is, only if it were 
made clear that moral imitation had nothing to do with mere external reflexes, but 
truly partook in reflection. Intellectual imitation was to be salvaged as imitation’s 
moral kernel, while instinctive imitation was to be discarded as its immoral husk. 
I will spend the rest of the article considering Kant’s attitude towards 
imitation, and I will find precisely the same ambivalence towards the concept as is 
present in many of his contemporaries. 
 
  
IMITATION IN KANT’S ETHICS 
 
THE AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS IMITATION IN THE GROUNDWORK 
Kant’s Groundwork celebrates the autonomy of the good act. This early work 
is dominated by a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy which shapes the 
rest of his ethical philosophy. He states, 
Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself 
(independently of any property of the objects of volition)… [whereas] if the 
will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of 
its maxims for its own giving of universal law – consequently, if, in going 
beyond itself, it seeks this law in a property of any of its objects – 
heteronomy always results. (Kant 1996b 4:440-1)7 
The good will is the autonomous will; it is the will which is self-contained, free and 
independent. It is hidden and inscrutable to mere sensuous intuition. It is the will 
                                               
7 All page references to Kant’s works are to the standard Akademie edition. 
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which is its own ‘law-giver’: “Lawgiving must be found in every rational being 
himself and be able to arise from his will” (4:434). Heteronomy, on the other hand, is 
detrimental to morals; it is the state in which the will is coerced into willing by an 
external maxim, where it does not give laws but is given them. Kant’s moral universe 
is, to this extent, dual. On the one hand, there are inclinations, sensible and external 
motives, that press upon the will to be realised; it is the subject’s duty to avoid acting 
on these. On the other hand, there is the purity of the categorical imperative, reason 
itself, which it is the subject’s duty to realise. 
 It is in the midst of this picture that Kant alludes a number of times in the text 
to the problem of imitation. His first mention of the problem seems to resolve the 
issue straight-out: “Imitation has no place at all in matters of morality.” (4:409) Kant 
could hardly have been more emphatic: mimesis cannot be tolerated; it is unethical. 
This, of course, makes sense on Kant’s ethics: emulating another subject (even 
another autonomous subject) is always heteronomous, because it is always to choose 
to act on the sensible inclination received from the other, rather than the categorical 
imperative which is one’s own. To imitate is always to obey an external voice instead 
of the force of one’s own reason. Mimesis is bad because it is heteronomous; it 
involves desire for something outside one’s own reason. 
 
 However, despite the simplicity of such a statement, things are not this simple. 
For example, Kant writes in a footnote on “the teachings of virtue”:  
If we represent an action of integrity done with steadfast soul, apart from 
every view to advantage of any kind in this world or another… it elevates the 
soul and awakens a wish to be able to act in like manner oneself. (4:411)  
A sensible representation of an autonomous act should, Kant here claims, incite 
mimesis, a desire “to act in like manner oneself”: some form of imitation of the good 
does here seem proper to moral consciousness. There is, therefore, a point to 
imitation; the question, however, remains whether any notion of imitation can be 
formulated without succumbing to the pitfall of heteronomy. 
 
There is also a third passage in the Groundwork, perhaps the most famous 
passage in the whole of Kant’s philosophy on the subject of imitation. What makes 
this passage even more significant for us is that the discussion of mimesis here occurs 
in relation to the imitatio Christi itself; what is at stake is the very possibility of 
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copying Christ’s life in a moral manner. Moreover, this passage exemplifies the 
ambivalence towards imitation found between the previous two passages. Kant writes, 
Nor could one give worse advice to morality than by wanting to derive it 
from examples. For, every example of it represented to me must itself first be 
appraised in accordance with principles of morality, as to whether it is also 
worthy to serve as an original example, that is, as a model; it can by no 
means authoritatively provide the concept of morality. Even the Holy One of 
the Gospel must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before 
he is cognised as such. (4:408) 
Kant begins the passage by firmly ruling out moral imitation: exemplarity is, indeed, 
the worst possible path to follow in order to arrive at the good. Yet, in the very 
explanation of this prohibition, he seems to end up – despite himself – providing a 
schema for just how such exemplarity could be possible! Thus, Kant does not deny 
that Christ can in fact be an ‘ideal of moral perfection’; rather, he just makes clear 
that, in order to be so, his empirical action must be rationally reflected upon by way 
of our own ideal (the categorical imperative). Hence, an exemplar can ‘by no means 
authoritatively’ provide an instance of the good (again this qualification suggests that 
the possibility is not totally excluded), that is, it cannot do so by heteronomously 
forcing reason to mimic something external; however, an exemplar can still be 
morally helpful, Kant implies, if it is able be an instance of the good after being 
‘appraised in accordance with principles of morality’.  Imitation is possible if the 
exemplar is made conformable to our own human vocation: imitating what is other is 
heteronomous, but imitating what has been appropriated as our own is indeed a 
possible form of autonomy.8 Judgment is prior to imitation, but if what is to be 
imitated is judged worthy of so being, then imitation – having passed through the 
hermeneutic of reason – is legitimate. The distinction Kant makes is one that we saw 
in Moritz and Herder: while an immediate desire to imitate the other is to be rejected, 





                                               
8 Notice also Kant’s words, “our ideal of moral perfection” – the human ideal is intersubjective, thus it 
requires support from outside to strengthen its universality. Imitation emphasises what is shared and 
intersubjective; it points to the universality of our ideal properly conceived. 
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A CONTINUAL AMBIVALENCE 
The Groundwork is not definitive on the issue of imitation: at one point it 
point blank denies its moral significance, at another it equally strongly affirms it, and 
in a third passage Kant more circumspectly suggests the moral usefulness of imitation 
but only by making the traditional eighteenth-century distinction between moral-
rational and instinctive mimesis. The ambivalence found in this early work on ethics 
remains with Kant until the end. Thus, on the one hand, the Metaphysics of Morals 
draws attention to the degeneracy of “blind imitation”9, and the Lectures on 
Pedagogy, published in 1803, categorically state, in regard to moral education, that 
“everything is spoiled if one tries to ground this culture on examples” (Kant 2007 
9:475)10. 
However, on the other hand, there is a continuing desire on Kant’s part to 
salvage some form of imitation in ethics. An example from the Metaphysics of Morals 
will be enough to demonstrate this. At the very end of the work, §52, he explicitly 
discusses the very problem of imitation which had haunted his earlier work. I quote 
the significant paragraph in full. 
The experimental (technical) means for cultivating virtue is good example on 
the part of the teacher (his exemplary conduct) and cautionary example in 
others, since, for a still undeveloped human being, imitation is the first 
determination of his will to accept maxims that he afterwards makes for 
himself. – To form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any 
maxim, through frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination; it is a 
mechanism of sense rather than a principle of thought (and one that is easier 
to acquire than to get rid of afterwards). – As for the power of examples 
(good and bad) that can be held up to the propensity for imitation or warning, 
what others give us can establish no maxim of virtue. For a maxim of virtue 
consists precisely in the subjective autonomy of each human being’s practical 
reason and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct of other human 
beings, must serve as our incentive. Accordingly a teacher will not tell his 
naughty pupil: take an example from that good (orderly, diligent) boy! For 
this would only cause him to hate that boy, who puts him in an unfavourable 
                                               
9 “A human being cannot carry his giving an example of the respect due to others so far as to 
degenerate into blind imitation (in which custom, mos, is raised to the dignity of a law), since such a 
tyranny of popular mores would be contrary to his duty to himself.” (Kant 1996d 6:464) 
10 There is some controversy about exactly when these lecture notes date from, but it seems likely that 
they were revised after 1801. See the translator’s discussion on p462 of the work. 
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light. A good example (exemplary conduct) should not serve as a model but 
only as a proof that it is really possible to act in conformity with duty. So it is 
not comparison with any other human being whatsoever (as he is), but with 
the idea (of humanity), as he ought to be, and so comparison with the law, 
that must serve as the constant standard of a teacher’s instruction. (6:479-80) 
The first words of this paragraph celebrate imitation’s relevance to morality more than 
any others in Kant’s oeuvre: exemplary conduct to be imitated by the pupil, Kant 
states categorically, the ‘experimental’ means for cultivating virtue. However, such 
commendation is quickly followed by a qualification, which in the end serves to 
distance imitation from morality proper. Imitation is merely a habit of the senses; it 
does not yet belong to the faculty of thought, which alone is worthy of morality. 
Imitation is merely a prelude to this, a means to habituate the will towards the good 
that it must afterwards discover itself. A principle obtained through imitation is not 
itself a ‘maxim of virtue’ even though it is the best, and perhaps only, means of 
cultivating such virtue experimentally. 
 It is for this reason Kant distinguishes between imitation as a model and 
imitation as a proof.11 Imitation cannot be an appropriate model for ethical practice or 
practical reasoning, since they cannot have any external reference but must rather be 
generated by one’s own autonomous reason. However, imitation is useful for practical 
reason as a proof that virtue is possible: another’s conduct should not be conceived as 
an imperative to follow (as a maxim), but as a fact to be experienced, and hence an 
aid in choosing the good (as it has now been perceived to be possible).12 Another’s 
conduct supports our own choice of the good, since it is a phenomenal manifestation 
displaying the worth of so choosing the good.  
We see here how Kant’s theory of imitation has developed. It retains the basic 
property implied in the Groundwork, that another’s example to be morally significant 
                                               
11 This distinction (and the consequences that follow from it) must be taken with a pinch of salt, for the 
very example which Kant uses in the above quotation to adduce it by declaring the teacher’s practice of 
promoting competition illegitimate, is, in contrast, described elsewhere in his work as “the case in 
which emulation could be of some use” (2007 9:491). This passage from the Lectures on Pedagogy 
also demonstrates Kant’s continuing attraction to the dualism we saw in Moritz, in which a ‘useful’ 
version of imitation is salvaged from the more general “inappropriate spirit of emulation” which is “a 
quite ignoble way of thinking” (ibid.). 
12 Indeed, I interpret Kant here as envisaging ‘exemplary conduct’ as ‘a fact of experience’ parallel to 
the ‘fact of reason’, freedom (and more generally the other postulates). Imitation, like the postulates, 
makes sense of human ethical action – by exemplifying its possibility. 
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must be mediated through one’s own reason.13 However, imitation is now given a 
determinate role in this mediation: it is to act as the evidence (as distinct from any 
form of motivation) which indirectly incites the will to act according to its own sense 
of duty. 
 
Having now considered the problem of imitation as it runs through Kant’s 
ethical thought, as well as his attempted solution to the problem therein, it is time to 





 With the foregoing as prelude – I now want to consider what I contend is 
Kant’s most definitive formulation of the problem of imitation, which he achieves in 
attempting to formulate the imitatio Christi. Kant’s actual discussion of the imitatio 
Christi in the Religion is exceedingly brief: it occupies three paragraphs, that is, half 
of sub-section B (“The Objective Reality of this Idea”) of Section 1 (“Concerning the 
Rightful Claim of the Good Principle to Dominion over the Human Being”) of the 
second part of the work. However, these paragraphs are tortuously condensed and 
complex, and this in itself indicates the continuing ambivalence Kant felt towards 
imitation. There are, I will show below, three separate attempts made by Kant in these 
three paragraphs to satisfactorily articulate the traditional Christian doctrine of the 
imitatio Christi. 
 At this point in his exposition, Kant has reached the stage at which he has 
demonstrated that “to become a morally good human being it is not enough simply to 
let the germ of the good which lies in our species develop unhindered; there is in us 
an active and opposing cause of evil which is also to be combated” (Kant 1998 6:57). 
Moreover, he has also shown the means by which evil can be successfully combated – 
by conforming oneself to “Humanity (rational being in general as pertaining to the 
world) in its full moral perfection” (6:60), or, more traditionally put, in imitating 
Christ. Christ is thus for Kant (at this stage) the rational idea of the most morally 
perfect possible human, and from such an ideal there necessarily follows a constraint 
                                               
13 Hence, the last sentence of the above passage from the Metaphysics of Morals reads very similarly to 
the last sentence I quoted from the third passage involving imitation in the Groundwork. 
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on our will to become like it: “It is our universal human duty to elevate ourselves to 
this ideal of moral perfection, i.e. to the prototype of moral disposition in its entire 
purity” (6:61). In obeying the ideal, reason imitates Christ; such imitation is to 
“steadfastly cling to the prototype of humanity and follow this prototype’s example in 
loyal emulation” (6:62). 
  
However, to make the imitation of Christ equivalent to following the dictates 
of reason is not enough for Kant. In the next section, “The Objective Reality of this 
Idea”, he attempts to go further and show that this prototype of humanity must be 
assumed to have existed in the world phenomenally and so be more than a mere idea 
of reason. To imitate Christ is to imitate another being acting in front of one in the 
world. Kant shows his desire to move closer to a traditional theological worldview 
than is generally admitted by giving more attention to incarnation than standard 
accounts of Kantianism permit. Kant contends first, that Jesus of Nazareth lived (or at 
least there is no reason to assume he did not), and, second, that it is our moral 
imperative to imitate that life – and not merely to imitate an idea of reason. 
 Such an interpretation is not inferable from the first paragraph of the section, 
however. Kant is here intent on showing how unnecessary such an objective existence 
of the idea would be. In so doing, he tackles head-on the theory of imitation he will 
later develop in the Metaphysics of Morals: that imitation is needed as a proof of the 
possibility of acting morally. In Religion, Kant rejects this theory – no proof of the 
categorical imperative should impinge on moral action in any way. He writes, “From 
the practical point of view this idea [Christ] has complete reality within itself.” The 
idea alone is sufficient for demonstrating its own feasibility in the sensible world: 
“We ought to conform to it, and therefore we must be able to.” The very fact that the 
idea of a perfected humanity imposes upon our will the incentive to emulate it is 
enough to demonstrate the possibility of such emulation.14 The idea of reason is 
sufficient; no phenomenal supplement is required. From this two consequences 
follow: first, the hypothesis of imitation as proof is rendered superfluous, and, second, 
Christ’s objective existence (his Incarnation) becomes unnecessary. (6:62) 
                                               
14 Kant writes, “Even if there had never been one human being capable of unconditional obedience to 
the law, the objective necessity that there be such a human being would yet be undiminished and self-
evident. There is no need, therefore, of any example from experience to make the idea of a moral 
human being morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as model already in our 
reason.” 
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 However, a strange transition takes place at the beginning of the second 
paragraph. Rather than concluding that he has just demonstrated the superfluity of 
Christ’s objective existence, Kant instead concludes that he has proved its possibility: 
“Just for this reason an experience must be possible in which the example of such a 
being is given”. This is in fact the case: since his argument for the superfluity of the 
Incarnation was based on the idea of reason providing its own proof for the possibility 
of being realised, it is possible for someone (Christ, for instance) to have once realised 
it. Thus, (quite unexpectedly) Kant achieves the first conclusion set out above: there is 
no reason to think that Jesus did not live “a course of life entirely blameless and as 
meritorious as indeed one may ever wish”. (6:63)15 The Incarnation is compatible 
with Kantian philosophy. 
It is from such a perspective that Kant now begins to deal with the imitatio 
Christi: having shown that a traditional imitation of the life of Jesus of Nazareth is a 
possibility (since there is no reason to doubt such a life), Kant begins his 
demonstration of how such imitation could be at all consistent with morality.  
 
FIRST ATTEMPT 
 The first attempt at reconciling imitation of a phenomenal Christ with his 
moral theory does not lead Kant very far. Indeed, he rehearses many of the obvious 
problems with this synthesis that had already occurred in the Groundwork. He states, 
According to the law, each and every human being should furnish in his own 
self an example of this idea. And the required prototype always resides only 
in reason, since outer experience yields no example adequate to the idea, it 
does not disclose the inwardness of the disposition but only allows inference 
to it, though not with strict certainty. (6:63) 
Kant outlines two familiar obstacles to imitation here. First, imitation is an external 
relation to someone else’s imperative, whereas morality resides in autonomy, in 
obeying one’s own sense of duty. Thus, rather than imitate another, all humans should 
‘furnish in his own self an example of this idea’. Second, the condition for a good 
action resides in its compliance to practical reason; however, such reason remains 
                                               
15 Of course, this is not to say that Kant subscribes to the whole Biblical narrative of Jesus’ life; even in 
this section he is intent on downplaying any form of miraculous action in Jesus’ life (6:62), and, in the 
previous section, he had given the phrase, ‘the Son of God’, a purely allegorical interpretation (6:61-2). 
Kant’s Imitatio Christi 17
inscrutable to the spectator, limited as she is to intuition of the sensible.16 Consigned 
to the phenomenal and so excluded from perceiving the ethical action in itself, ‘outer 
experience yields no example adequate to the idea’.  
In terms of imitation, this means that the good cannot be imitated because it is 
never perceived as such. Even Christ, even the idea of morally perfected humanity 
itself, Kant thus suggests, does not shine forth as unproblematically good in the 
phenomenal realm, but is rather subject to the ineluctable ambiguities of sensible 
existence. It is for these reasons that Kant is so ambivalent towards imitation in his 
ethical writings, and why, in the Metaphysics of Morals, he consigns it to a 
prolegomena to morality proper. No moral imitation of Christ is possible on the 
condition of his objective existence. 
 In this way, Kant’s first attempt fails. It seems that Christ cannot truly exist 
phenomenally and be an object of imitation. One of them must be discarded. In the 
previous section, Kant had shown how the imitatio Christi was perfectly possible as 
long as Christ remained a mere intellectual prototype with no pretensions to objective 
existence; this paragraph shows that as long as Christ is believed to have existed in 
the sensible world, he cannot be imitated as an example of the good. As soon as Jesus 
is said to have been incarnated, he can only be an exemplar “to the extent that one can 
at all expect and ask for evidence of inner moral disposition from an external 
experience” (6:63), that is, not at all. 
 
SECOND ATTEMPT 
 Kant, therefore, begins again. He is again intent on not retreating to his 
position in the previous section in which Christ was merely a subjective ideal, 
belonging to thought but alien to the world of sense. Kant wants to demonstrate his 
theological orthodoxy by showing both that there is no reason on his philosophical 
views to deny Christ’s Incarnation (which he has just demonstrated) and also that 
there is a compatibility between the imitation of the life of Jesus and his moral theory. 
 It is for this reason that the second attempt begins by presupposing Christ’s 
phenomenal existence as a premise; that is, Kant begins with the Incarnation as an 
assumed fact, “If a human being of such a truly divine disposition had descended, as it 
were, from heaven to earth at a specific time…”. Kant, then, goes on to assume a 
                                               
16 Indeed, Kant continues, such compliance to practical reason is not even entirely transparent to the 
subject herself. 
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number of the tenets of theological orthodoxy that Christ “exhibited in his self, 
through teaching, conduct and suffering, the example of a human being well-pleasing 
to God” and also that he instigated “a revolution in the human race” towards the good. 
(6:63) 
From these facts two possible interpretations follow: that Christ could have 
achieved this as a human or as divine. Of course, Kant is well aware that traditionally 
both statements are predicated of Christ, but in separating them he is being charitable: 
it is not that both interpretations must be demonstrated (Christ fulfilled the above list 
of achievements both as human and divine), rather Kant would in fact be satisfied if 
either of them managed to be shown. 
He turns first to Christ’s humanity, and writes, “Even then [after the above 
actions traditionally ascribed to Christ] we would have no cause to assume in him 
anything else except a naturally begotten human being (because he too feels to be 
under the obligation to exhibit such an example himself)” (6:63). This is all Kant has 
to say about this option, he seems to think he has concluded against it and moves on 
to Christ as divine. Indeed, Kant has just shown (in the first attempt) why Christ 
cannot be imitated morally if he is assumed to be human: Christ (as human) is no 
more worthy of imitation than any other virtuous human, the imitation of whom, as 
Kant makes clear in his ethical writings, can never belong to ethics proper but only its 
prolegomena. 
Is Christ as divine any more worthy of imitation? Of course, in one respect he 
obviously is, since what is divine about him is precisely his commensurability with 
the idea of a morally perfected humanity. Yet, such a conclusion cannot get Kant 
beyond the conclusions already established in the previous section. Thus, the question 
is rather whether Christ – as an objectively existing divinity existing alongside 
individual humans – is worthy of imitation. This is Kant’s response: “The elevation of 
a Holy One above every frailty of human nature would rather stand in the way of the 
practical adoption of the ideas of such a being for our imitation.”(6:64) As divine, 
Christ is utterly unlike humanity, and so cannot conceivably be imitated; indeed, 
imitation becomes impossible on this view.17 Kant continues, “The consequent 
distance from the natural human being would then again become so infinitely great 
that the divine human being could no longer be held forth to the natural human being 
                                               
17 Such a view correlates with the third passage quoted above from the Groundwork, in which to 
imitate something inassimilable to humanity was heteronomous. 
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as example.” (ibid.) Christ as divine can no longer be a role-model, for he shares so 
little with man; this is not to say he does not have moral significance – indeed Kant 
affirms that Christ’s divinity should give rise “to admiration, love and thankfulness 
toward him”. “Yet,” he concludes categorically, “he himself could not be presented to 
us as an example to be emulated, hence also not as a proof that so pure and exalted a 
moral goodness can be practised and attained by us.” (ibid.)  
Both alternatives fall short of a satisfactory formulation of imitation. Thus, 
Kant’s attempt at reconciling Christ’s objective existence with morally significant 
imitation of him ends in failure once again. 
 
THIRD ATTEMPT 
 It is thus surprising that Kant then embarks once again on an attempt to 
formulate the imitatio, and what is even more surprising is that this time he thinks he 
succeeds. The new element, however, Kant brings to this attempt is his unconcern for 
Christ immediately displaying the good in his conduct within the phenomenal world. 
Kant is no longer interested in the immediate properties of Christ’s objective 
existence in the world, such as his conduct, his suffering, his exemplary acts of 
charity etc. None of these are relevant to our imitation of him. Instead, what Kant is 
now interested in is Christ’s discourse, the fact that he “speak[s] truly of himself as if 
the ideal of goodness were displayed incarnate in him (in his teaching and conduct)” 
(6:66). What makes Christ a role model is what he teaches about himself: Christ’s 
exemplarity is mediated through his own discourse, rather than emanating from his 
mere empirical behaviour.18 Hence, Kant writes Christ “would be speaking only of the 
disposition which he makes the rule of his actions but which, since he cannot make it 
visible as an example to others in and of itself, he places it before their eyes externally 
through his teachings” (ibid.). Only when mediated through his pedagogical relation 
to the world can Christ make his moral disposition evident to other subjects, and only 
then can he both exist objectively and remain an exemplar to be followed. 
Exemplarity is only possible on the basis of teaching: 
When expressed in thought as the ideal of humankind, such a disposition [as 
Christ’s is]… is perfectly valid for all human beings, at all times, and in all 
                                               
18 There is a rejection here of traditional empiricist understandings of the operations of example. The 
example is not an immediate and literal manifestation of a concept, but is itself mediated through 
discourse. Kant’s use of Christ here suggests a very different way of understanding the role of sensible 
examples in his work. 
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worlds, before the highest righteousness, whenever a human being makes his 
own like unto it, as he ought… An appropriation of it for the sake of our own 
[disposition] must be possible, provided that ours is associated with the 
disposition of the prototype. (ibid.) 
We can become good through an “appropriation” of Christ’s goodness (expressed 
intellectually in his teaching), by imitating what he teaches rather than what he is. 
The problem of imitation is here circumvented: while another’s good action can never 
be exemplary for us, through another’s thought of the good we can learn to be good 
ourselves – since that proceeds directly from their reason to our reason, without being 
corrupted by realisation in the sensible realm.19 Christ can be imitated via pedagogical 
mediation. 
 In this third attempt, therefore, Kant finally does manage to reconcile Christ’s 
objective existence with a morally significant imitation of him. Yet, it is not Christ’s 
existence itself which gives the solution, but the teaching which he imparts about the 
good (when objectively existing in the world). It is this teaching which provides the 
motivation for good action. Imitation is not founded on the contingency of immediate 
existence, but made possible through teaching as a form of rational communication; 
only what is shared intersubjectively in rational agreement can be imitated, Kant here 
claims. In pedagogy, action-guiding norms are worked through between us with our 
participation and consent20: the good is produced in dialogue, not imposed upon us as 
an obligation. This is Kant’s reconception of the Kingdom of Ends!21 
What is more, imitation is here not merely a prolegomena to true morality; it is 
part of the process of practical reasoning itself. However, neither is it the case that all 
imitation is valorised: only what proceeds through discourse about the good is 
salvaged as feasible for an imitatio Christi. This is – to quote Moritz once more – 





                                               
19 Hence, the problem of incarnation is still only left aside rather than tackled head-on. 
20 Although, of course, such intersubjective rational norms are always provisional and open-ended: they 
are always a task to be fulfilled. 
21 In this way, it foreshadows the third part of the Religion which will emphasise even more explicitly 
the sociality underlying morality. 
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A SOCRATIC CHRIST 
 
Kant gives in his imitatio Christi a model for truly moral imitation: the 
imitation of what is good mediated through discursive reasoning about the good. 
However, at the same time, the discussion in the Religion suggests only the barest 
possible sketch of what such a model might look like. I will now – in this final section 
– attempt to speculatively fill out this model by returning to Kant’s ethical writings.  
There is, indeed, one aspect of this model that has become certain – morally 
significant imitation is bound up with teaching the good.  
However, the very possibility of moral teaching is problematic for Kant; 
hence, he writes in his Lectures on Pedagogy, 
One of the biggest problems of education is how we can unite submission 
under lawful constraint with the capacity to use one’s freedom. For constraint 
is necessary [since one is always being taught by someone else in whose 
power one must commit oneself]. How do I cultivate freedom under 
constraint? I shall accustom my pupil to tolerate a constraint of his freedom, 
and I shall at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. 
Without this everything is a mere mechanism, and the pupil who is released 
from education does not know how to use his freedom. (9:453) 
Despite these qualms, there are passages in Kant’s work where the possibility of 
moral teaching (and so its compatibility with autonomy) is elucidated. A final section 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, entitled “Teaching Ethics”, is, for example, devoted to 
it; it also receives considerable attention in part two of the second Critique; and the 
Lectures on Pedagogy contain sections treating it. Such passages will enable us, 
therefore, to get a grip on the way in which Kant conceived Christ’s teaching as a 
teaching of the good to be imitated. 
 I will begin with the “Teaching Ethics” section of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Despite his scepticism about the possibility of teaching the good in other texts and 
even elsewhere in this work, Kant is here adamant that virtue (at least) is teachable; 
he states, “That virtue can and must be taught already follows from its not being 
innate; a doctrine of virtue is therefore something that can be taught.” (6:477) 
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Morally-significant teaching can indeed take place.22 Kant then moves on to list what 
form such teaching of virtue could possibly take: 
As for the method of teaching… it can be set forth either by lectures, when 
all those to whom it is directed merely listen, or else by questions, when the 
teacher asks his pupils what he wants to teach them. And this erotetic method 
is, in turn, divided into the method of dialogue and that of catechism, 
depending on whether the teacher addresses his questions to the pupil’s 
reason or just to his memory. For if the teacher wants to question his pupil’s 
reason he must do this in a dialogue in which teacher and pupil question and 
answer each other in turn. The teacher, by his questions, guides his young 
pupil’s course of thought merely by presenting him with cases in which his 
predisposition for certain concepts will develop (the teacher is the midwife of 
the pupil’s thoughts).” (6:478) 
There are three methods described here: lecturing, in which the pupil is merely 
passive, catechism, in which only the pupil’s memory is active and finally dialogue, in 
which the whole of the pupil’s reason is actively engaged in practical thinking. This 
latter method is Socratic: the teacher uses her questions to arouse anamnesis of the 
good – the innate categorical imperative – through activating her pupil’s thinking. In 
the Lectures on Pedagogy, the Socratic method is revealed as Kant’s favoured mode 
of moral education: 
In the formation of reason, we must proceed Socratically… On many matters 
children do not need to exercise reason. They must not reason about 
everything. They do not need to know the reasons for everything which is 
meant to make them well-educated. But as soon as duty is concerned, then 
the reasons in question must be made known to them. However, in general, 
one must see to it that one does not carry rational knowledge into them but 
rather extracts it from them. The Socratic method should be the rule for the 
catechetical method. (9:477) 
The Socratic method is the “rule” for ethical teaching, for it activates the child’s 
reason and cultivates autonomy, allowing the child to think for herself and produce 
maxims for herself, rather than the teacher ‘carrying’ such maxims ‘into’ her. 
 Moreover, Socratic dialogue is, in the same way, a very promising model for 
Christ’s teaching. A Socratic Christ would cultivate the disciple’s knowledge of the 
                                               
22 Again, therefore, Kant goes beyond his own model in the Metaphysics of Morals in which such an 
external relation can be at most a prelude to ethics proper 
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good without restricting her autonomy; in the imitatio Christi, the disciple is not 
passively imitating anything he has stated, but rather actively imitating what she and 
Christ achieve together in dialogue – the knowledge of the good produced by the 
process of his teaching, rather than the propositional sense his teachings convey. The 
emphasis is on teaching’s perlocutionary effects, rather than its locutionary meaning. 
 
 The properties of such Socratic teaching can be seen even more clearly in a 
model Kant proposes in the Critique of Practical Reason, where, at the end of the 
work, he embarks on a description of what this cultivation of moral judgment and 
rational agreement would look like in action. Groups of people, he observes, have a 
natural inclination to argue and “of all arguments there are none that more excite the 
participation of persons who are otherwise soon bored with subtle reasoning and that 
bring a certain liveliness into the company than arguments about the moral worth of 
this or that action by which the character of some person is to be made out.” (5:153) 
He continues, 
I do not know why educators of young people have not long since made use 
of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon even the most subtle 
examination of the practical questions put to them and why they have not, 
after first laying the foundation in a purely moral catechism, searched 
through all the biographies of ancient and modern times in order to have at 
hand instances for the duties presented, in which, especially by comparison of 
similar actions under different circumstances, they could well activate their 
pupils appraisal in marking the lesser or greater moral import of such actions; 
they would find that someone very young, who is not yet ready for 
speculation, would soon become very acute and not a little interested, since 
he would feel the progress of his faculty of judgment; and, what is most 
important, they could hope with confidence that frequent practice in knowing 
good conduct in all its purity and approving it and, on the other hand, 
marking with regret or contempt the least deviation from it, even though it is 
carried on only as a game of judgment… by mere habituation, repeatedly 
looking on such actions as deserving approval or censure, would make a good 
foundation for uprightness in the future conduct of life. (5:154-5)23 
                                               
23 In the Lectures on Pedagogy, Kant labels this method the “catechism of right”, and continues (this 
time with examples): “It would have to contain cases which would be popular, which occur in ordinary 
life, and which would always naturally raise the question whether something is right or not. For 
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Socratic questioning here receives a Rousseauan gist.24 Just as Rousseau recommends 
that children discard their books to learn morality by considering examples, so in a 
very similar way Kant conceives the role of the Socratic teacher to be that of 
proposing concrete historical examples of actions and asking her pupils to judge their 
moral worth.25 Such ‘experimental’ methods, Kant claims, will exercise and so 
strengthen the pupil’s practical reason, cultivating her autonomy and ability to make 
moral decisions. 
 In fact, such an activity seems to be precisely what Kant has in mind with 
Christ’s teaching. The only significant difference is that, while the merely human 
Socratic teacher must draw examples from ancient history, Christ is able to discourse 
about the example which is his own life. Thus, in the Religion, Kant does not merely 
draw attention to Christ’s discourse but rather his discourse about himself: he is “able 
to speak truly of himself as if the ideal of goodness were displayed incarnate in him” 
(6:66; my emphasis). Christ does not speak of the good in the abstract, but rather “he 
would be speaking only of the disposition which he makes the rule of his actions” 
(ibid; my emphases). While the method of Christ’s teaching may be Socratic, the 
subject matter (in traditional Johannine fashion) is Christ himself. Prosaically put, 
Kant seems to conceive the imitation of Christ as proceeding in the following manner: 
Christ, in his speech, points to the example of his own irreproachable behaviour and 
asks why it is good; in answering this question, the disciples must use their own 
practical reason for themselves in deliberating on the moral law and how it is realised; 
such deliberation cultivates and strengthens the role of the moral law in the disciples’ 
mind. The result of this fruit is a newly awakened appreciation of the categorical 
imperative – this is the product of Christ’s teaching, and it is this which the disciple 
must imitate. Such is the Kantian imitatio Christi. Indeed, we can see in this Socratic 
Christ a member of the vanguard Kant calls upon in “What is Enlightenment?”: 
There will always be a few independent thinkers, even among the established 
guardians of the great masses, who, after having themselves cast off the yoke 
                                                                                                                                      
example, if someone who should pay his creditor today is touched through the sight of someone in 
need and gives him the sum which he owes and should now pay – is this right or not?” (9:490) 
24 Although the passage is followed with a jibe that could perhaps be read as a criticism of Rousseau: “I 
do wish educators would spare their pupils examples of so-called noble (supermeritorious) actions, 
with which our sentimental writings so abound” (5:155) 
25 Of course, a problem still remains of how these examples can be truly judged since their ground 
remains inscrutable. A tantalising space seems to open up here for imagination and the aesthetic to 
have a role in cultivating moral judgment. 
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of minority, will disseminate the spirit of rational valuing of one’s own worth 
and of the calling of each individual to think for himself. (Kant 1996a 8:36) 
 
 
 Therefore, in comparison to the celebration of mimesis in contemporary 
theory, which transforms imitation into a form of desire, and sometimes even a 
biological instinct. The eighteenth-century’s discussion of imitation took place on a 
more sceptical footing. There was a profound unease about the moral implications of 
the concept – it seemed to border on duplicity, on external legalism, on heteronomy. It 
was in this context that many thinkers attempted to distinguish a moral form of 
imitation mediated through reason. I have followed in this paper many of the twists 
and turns Kant embarks on in order to rescue some conception of imitation for his 
moral theory. In his imitatio Christi, this ends up as a form of autonomous thinking 
upon an example of the good rationally communicated. While a concern for the good 
of desire always remains prior to actual desire for the good in Kant’s thought, the two 
become compatible in his vision of a Socratic Christ. 
 Indeed, what I hope to have brought out of Kant’s work is not only a challenge 
to traditional interpretations of his Christology (his views on the interplay between the 
human and the divine in our worldly existence), but a different way of conceiving 
imitation in general. This form of self-betterment through another is not to be 
conceived on a model of desire, nor by means of some illusory projection of the self, 
but on the basis of an intersubjective relation of rational discussion and education 
which helps move the self towards a shared ideal of incarnate rationality. Such an 
ideal is not embodied in Christ as divine and other to man, but rather is developed in 
the interchange of ideas between self and exemplar. As such, the self partakes in this 
communal ideal as its own. Thus, this imitatio Christi belongs to a humanity aiming 
to become more fully rational and struggling to remain both moral and incarnate; it 
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